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LAWRENCE C. BECKER Criminal Attempt and the 
Theory of the Law of Crimes 
The fundamental problem addressed in this paper is that of getting 
an adequate rational justification for the distinction the law draws 
between criminal and noncriminal wrongs. But because theorizing 
about the law is not only vacuous but likely to be positively misguided 
apart from a consideration of concrete issues in the law, I want to 
frame the discussion of theory with an example of its application. 
I have chosen, as the example, a proposal for reforming the law of 
criminal attempt-specifically the proposal that, at least in many 
cases, successful crimes and (the corresponding) attempted crimes 
should be punished equally. I have chosen this example both because 
it has intrinsic interest and because the current status of attempt law, 
as well as discussion of it, directly reflects what I will argue is a 
mistaken theory of the law of crimes, and thus is a oonvenient way of 
introducing my own view. Due to the fact that the law of attempts has 
several complex elements, much of what follows will be about those 
elements. But this should not be allowed to mask the fact that the 
philosophical crux of the paper is in its discussion of the fundamental 
aims of criminal law. 
There are two additional remarks to be made as preliminaries. 
I am indebted to Joseph Raz, Thomas T. Lawson, Theodore Long, Lewis H. 
La Rue, and the members of the Hollins College Seminar in Philosophy for help 
with an early draft of this paper. Jesse Zeldin and Roscoe Hill gave me useful 
bibliographical material at the same stage. A shortened version was read to the 
Virginia Philosophical Association in October 1973. Valuable criticism from that 
group, from Charles A. Fried, and from the editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
have gone into the current version of the paper. 
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First, I will speak throughout of punishment for crimes, because that 
is the traditional way of speaking. But my argument is independent 
of the question of whether we should "punish" criminals, in the usual 
sense, at all. Everything argued for here is perfectly compatible with 
less retributivistic ways of speaking. Further, the proposal for equal 
penalization of attempts and successes is independent of the question 
of whether one should equalize the penalties by raising those for at-
tempt or by lowering those for success. 
Second, and more importantly, it must be noted that there is general 
agreement that no adequate single principle can be found which 
will provide a rational basis for the full variety of wrongs currently 
involved in the criminal/noncriminal distinction. The law has grown 
in too random a fashion for that, and we shall, I suppose, never be 
able to find a plausible theory of the law of crimes which justifies both 
treating pilfering petty cash as criminal and certain sorts of highly 
harmful breaches of contract as noncriminal. An historical explana-
tion is one thing; no doubt we can get that. But a single justifying 
principle is quite another matter. This is the difficulty which has led 
some writers to do little more than state the problem and then give 
up,1 and has caused others simply to ignore the problem for more 
promising pursuits.2 
But while it may not be possible-or even important-to get an ade-
quate single distinguishing principle, it is possible, I think, and quite 
important to get clear on what is fundamentally at stake here: that is, 
why it is that we mark off the major sorts of criminal wrongs from 
others and make them part of public, rather than private, law. This is 
an important task because there is general consensus in the legal 
profession on this more limited version of the problem, and I am con-
vinced that the consensus has latched onto a mistaken theory-a theory 
which is reflected in the treatment of attempted crimes, and which has 
contributed to the quite unnecessary overestimate of just how far from 
rational consistency the criminal law as a whole is. 
1. See P. J. Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment (Oxford, I962), p. 7. 
2. Glanville Williams, for example, in his enormous textbook on English 
criminal law, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed. (London, I96I), does not 
devote so much as a sentence to an attempt to define his subject in a general 
way. 
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I 
The common law was late in recognizing attempts as criminal. Early 
English law started from the principle that an attempt to do harm 
was no offense. 3 Of course, if a man wounded another in an attempt 
to kill him (or to steal from him, etc.), he could be punished for the 
wounding. But that was not punishment for an attempt at the more 
serious crime, and, apparently, if no physical damage was done by an 
attempt, no prosecution was possible, nor thought to be proper:!' It was 
not until the sixteenth century, in the Court of the Star Chamber, that 
the criminal law was consistently extended to attempts, and then it 
was apparently only extended to attempted felonies. 5 
The modern doctrine of criminal attempt had to wait until 1801 for 
its formulation. The case was Rex v. Higgins, a prosecution for the 
3. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2nd ed. I898: in the I952 
reprint by Cambridge University Press) II, p. 475 remark that the principle in 
English law at the end of the middle ages was "where there is no harm done, 
no crime is committed; an attempt to commit a crime is no crime." At page 509, 
they remark that this is true "as a general rule" of ancient (English) law. 
The situation was somewhat different on the Continent. Attempts were ap-
parently punished there all through the middle ages, though scholars have had 
little success in uncovering any theoretical discussion of the practice from that 
time. By the sixteenth century, attempt was included in recognized Continental 
criminal codes. See Jerome Hall, "Criminal Attempt: A Study of Foundations 
of Criminal Liability," Yale Law Journal 49 (I940): 789-79I. 
4. See Henrici de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (Twiss, 
ed. I878) vol. II, p. 337, where Bracton quotes as "well known" [illud] a phrase 
refusing penalties for attempts: "for what harm did the attempt cause, since the 
injury took no effect?" There was, however, an early English law against un-
lawful assembly, rout, and riot which held that any assembly of three or more 
persons for an illegal purpose, involving action toward that purpose, was punish-
able as a rout. As with the many acts held to constitute treason (e.g., writing 
letters denouncing the King, or making a bet that he would not live long), it is 
a fairly small conceptual step from such laws to the notion of criminal attempt. 
There are three early cases, in addition, which are sometimes cited as deviations 
from the usual practice. In one, reported in 27 Ass. pI. 38 (I353), Shardlowe, J. 
said, "One who is taken in the act of robbery or burglary even though he does not 
carry it out, will be hanged according to the law." The other two cases concern 
attempted murder, and in both cases, the culprits were hanged, the judges citing 
the maxim volantas reputabitur pro facto [the will is to be taken for the deed]. 
This particular excursion into Latin maxims quickly proved embarrassing and 
was not pursued in subsequent decisions. See, for a review of these matters, 
Jerome Hall, op. cit. 
5. See Hall, op. cit., pp. 796-797. 
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misdemeanor of solicitation. Higgins had asked a man's servant to 
steal a quantity of rope from the servant's master. The servant did 
nothing, but the plot was discovered and Higgins was brought to trial. 
His counsel argued that although an attempted felony was a crime, 
an attempt at a misdemeanor was not, and Higgins' act had clearly 
been no more than an abortive attempt at the misdemeanor of solicita-
tion. He was, however, convicted and the Court said in part: "every 
attempt to commit a crime, whether felony or misdemeanor, is itself 
a misdemeanor and indictable."6 This piece of judicial legislation was 
a success, and has been followed faithfully since. 
The situation at present is that, in England, criminal attempts re-
main punishable as common-law misdemeanors, with life imprison-
ment as a theoretical maximum. In practice, however, courts normally 
award lighter sentences for attempts than they do for complete of-
fenses, and in some cases, statutes require this.7 In the U.S., "the usual 
punishment grading system for attempt involves making [attempt] 
punishable by a reduced factor of the punishment for the completed 
crime. In California [for example] attempt carries a maximum term of 
not more than one-half of the highest maximum term authorized for 
the completed crime."8 In a small number of states-e.g., Illinois and 
Mississippi-most attempts are punished equally with successes. But 
even here, attempts at first degree felonies are punished less severely 
than the completed crimes. We can say, then, that the current practice 
generally treats attempted crimes more leniently than completed 
ones.9 
6. R. v. Higgins [I80I] 2 East S at II; 102 E.R. 269 at 272. 
7. Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment, p. 98. 
8. Sanford H. Kadish and Monrad G. Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes, 
2nd ed. (Boston, 1969), p. 368. 
9. The Model Penal Code, however, recommends the following sort of law: 
"Except as otherwise provided in this Section, attempt ... [is a crime] of the 
same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted .... An 
attempt ... to commit a [capital crime or a] felony of the first degree is a felony 
of the second degree" (American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (1962), 
§S.OS(I)). Earlier cultures in the West have also tended toward the more strin-
gent approach. The Romans punished attempts, and though for "ordinary" 
crimes an attempt got a lighter penalty than a success, for "atrocious" crimes 
attempts were apparently punished just as severely as completed crimes, at least 
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The standard arguments in support of current practice make the 
following points: 10 
( I) The Reform Argument. They acknowledge that, in terms of the 
reformative aims of penal sanctions, there is probably no point in dis-
tinguishing between attempts and successes. One who tries and fails 
is not likely (merely from that fact) to be in less need of reform than 
one who tries and succeeds. Thus we have some reason for punishing 
attempts and successes equally. 
(2) The Deterrence Argument. On the other hand, they hold that 
lesser penalties for attempts do not reduce the deterrent effect of the 
law, for at the stage when a person is contemplating a crime, the pen-
alty which has deterrent force for him (if any) is the one for what he 
intends to do. On the assumption that the criminal does not intend 
as long as the result of the attempt was not insignificant. See Hall, "Criminal 
Attempt," p. 790. And Plato has this to say about attempted murder: 
If anyone has a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his enemy, 
and whom the law does not permit him to slay, and he wounds him, but is 
unable to kill him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not to be 
pitied-he deserves no consideration, but should be regarded as a murderer and 
be tried for murder. Still having respect to the fortune which in a manner has 
favored him, and to the providence which in pity to him and to the wounded 
man saved the one from a fatal blow, and the other from an accursed fate and 
calamity-as a thank-offering to this deity, and in order not to oppose his will-
in such a case the law will remit the punishment of death, and only compel the 
offender to emigrate to a neighboring city for the rest of his life, where he 
shall remain in the enjoyment of all of his possessions. But if he have injured 
the wounded man, he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court 
deciding the case assess ... (Plato, Laws, Book IX: 877; trans. Jowett, Mod-
ern Library Editions, vol. 2, p. 621). 
In all these instances, however, from the earliest to the latest, there has been 
hesitation, if not fiat refusal, to treat attempt and success alike for all crimes, 
and ever to impose the death penalty for an attempt. 
Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law II, p. 497 n. 2, say, however, "It 
is further to be remembered that among some barbarous folks, which are not 
utterly lawless, successful theft is regarded with tolerance, if not admiration, 
and gives rise to a mere claim for the restoration of the goods, while 'manifest 
theft' is unsuccessful theft and exposes the thief to a beating." 
10. Examples of such arguments may be found in P. J. Fitzgerald, Criminal 
Law and Punishment, p. 98; Waite, John Barker, The Prevention of Repeated 
Crime (Ann Arbor, 1943), pp. 8-9; Hall, "Criminal Attempt," p. 817 n. 130; and 
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 10 (1960), comment 
to §S.oS. 
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merely to attempt, but rather to succeed, it follows that the severity 
of the penalty for attempt has little or no force as a deterrent. In ac-
cordance with the principle of minimizing pain, then, we have some 
reason for giving lesser penalties for attempts than for successes. 
(3) The Unequal Harm Argument. The conflict between (I) and 
(2) is resolved, or so the arguments go, by noting that since attempts 
do less actual harm than successes, the principles of proportionality 
and similar treatment for similar cases combine on the side of (2) to 
require the lesser penalties. We are committed, for good reason, to 
making the severity of punishments roughly proportionate to the grav-
ity of the wrongs done. (Consider, for example, the injunctions 
against "cruel and unusual pUnishments"-ordinarily interpreted to 
mean excessive or disproportionate punishments.) We are also com-
mitted, of course, as a part of a general commitment to rational deci-
sion-making, to treating similar wrongs similarly. If attempts do less 
harm than successes, the latter principle requires us to class them, on 
that basis at least, with crimes of similar gravity-Le., not with suc-
cesses. And if the penalty is to be proportional to the gravity of the 
offense, the lesser wrongs should get lesser penalties. 
I shall not deal with all the issues raised by such arguments. Specifi-
cally, I shall not attack the deterrence argument (2), even though I 
think it is contestable. I shall, rather, challenge the theory of criminal 
wrongs implicit in the unequal harm argument (3). If that argument 
falls, as it may when the theory of criminal wrongs is revised, and it is 
replaced with an equal harm argument (3) I, the principles of propor-
tionality and similar treatment for similar cases will combine on the 
side of the reform argument (I )-which I assume is uncontestable-to 
support equal punishment for attempts and successes. 
II 
A leading characteristic of the criminal law is that it is public law-a 
region in which society itself takes the initiative for prosecution and 
itself exacts the penalty. The major sorts of wrongs we classify as 
criminal are as old as law itself (murder, mayhem, theft ... ), but 
primitive law typically treated such matters, along with what we now 
call torts and breaches of contract, as private law problemsY It was 
II. B. Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford, 1962), p. 208. 
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not that people were then unaware of the distinction between murder 
and accidental death through negligence (or at least it would be odd 
to suppose so). They merely treated the two wrongs-legally-in the 
same way: by using the legal process to establish who the wrongdoer 
was, and to see to it that he made amends to the injured party. Thus 
indemnities were often acceptable penalties for killings of both sorts, 
and when they were not, they were replaced with Solomon-like provi-
sions which emphasized the private law nature of the system: e.g., if 
X falls from a tree and kills Y, Y's kinsman, if he insists on vengeance, 
is entitled to climb a tree and fall on X.12 
It is characteristic of private law that the initiative for prosecution 
rests with the injured party (or his representatives), and that the issue 
at stake is the satisfaction of his grievance. At some point (it is not 
clear just when) certain wrongs began to get special treatment. Prose-
cution in these cases no longer depended on the initiative of the in-
jured party; and the penalties assessed the wrongdoer were less and 
less designed to "satisfy" the victim. The thief was imprisoned rather 
than forced to make restitution. 
The historical explanation for this shift (which, of course, was a 
gradual process) is no doubt complex. Political utility was quite likely 
a large part of the cause, both in terms of the administration of the 
thickets of laws drawn up to protect and strengthen monarchs, and in 
terms of handling public outrage and public safety in the case of par-
ticularly vicious wrongdoers. Further, it is reasonable to suppose that 
as governments grew in strength, and sought popular support in terms 
of the stability and protection they could afford to citizens, the devel-
opment of a public law response to particularly "visible" and unsettling 
wrongs would follow. In addition, there were doubtless some moral 
demands which found expression in the growth of public law-partic-
ularly the principles of equity and desert in cases where no injured 
party remained to initiate an action (as in the murder of a destitute 
and "relationless" person), and probably convictions about Divine Law 
as well in cases where the government put itself forward as a servant 
of such. 
12. Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. n, p. 471, quote Leges Henrici at 90.§7 as 
saying that "if by mischance you fall from a tree upon me and kill me, then, if 
my kinsman must needs have vengeance, he may climb a tree and fall upon you." 
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But an historical explanation is one thing, and a rational justifica-
tion is another. It is the public law character of the whole criminal law 
as it now exists-from whatever historical causes-which must be justi-
fied, and it is clear that the hodgepodge of reasons one can assemble 
from the causes listed above will not even begin to produce a justifica-
tion. Why should the law take over the prosecution of fraud but not 
intentional breach of contract? Why should the prosecution of motor 
vehicle homicide be a matter for public initiative (and the penalty be 
imprisonment, even when the wrongdoer is uninsured) when deaths 
caused by the negligence of one's employer are not? Why, in general, 
is the amount of damage done to the victim, or the amount.of suffering 
he endures, or his capacity to initiate and carry through a prosecution 
not even a relevant factor in deciding which wrongs will be publicly 
prosecuted? (Mter all, one can die just as horrible a death by some-
one's noncriminal negligence as by intentional criminal conduct. And 
one can be just as incapable, financially or otherwise, of carrying 
through a lawsuit for breach of contract as one may be in carrying 
through a criminal prosecution.) And why are the penalties of the 
criminal law not directed toward recompense of the victim, at least 
where possible? 
When jurisprudents have reached for an answer to such questions-
or rather, to the general question of what is fundamentally at stake in 
distinguishing criminal from noncriminal wrongs-they have typically 
said two things: first, that the relevant distinguishing characteristic 
of the major sorts of wrongs defined as criminal is that they are social 
or public harms; and second, that no single distinguishing prinCiple 
can be found for the full range of criminal wrongs. 
The former point has become Virtually an uncontested definition in 
the law,13 Its rational appeal is obvious. If some harms are harms to 
13. "A crime may be described as an act, default or conduct prejudicial to the 
community, the commission of which by law renders the person responsible 
liable to punishment ... " (P. G. Osborn, A Concise Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 
[London, 1964], p. 97). "The distinction between a crime and a tort or civil 
injury is that the former is a breach and violation of the public right and of 
duties due to the whole community considered as such, and in its social and 
aggregate capacity; whereas the latter is an infringement or privation of the 
civil rights of individuals merely." Or again, "A crime, as opposed to a civil 
injury, is the violation of a right, considered in reference to the evil tendency 
of such violation, as regards the community at large" (Black's Law Dictionary, 
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the community as a whole, then it is only fitting that the community 
itself, through its legal officers, take the initiative for prosecution. And 
it is likewise fitting that the sanctions imposed for these harms should 
be designed to get the necessary community benefits (e.g., reform and 
deterrence). Indeed, it is hard to see what other theory could account 
for both public initiative and public-regarding sanctions for anything 
like the list of wrongs we now define as criminal. 
One can, of course, argue for public initiative as a way of spreading 
the cost of (personally) important prosecutions, but then one cannot 
draw the public/private law distinction between crimes on the one 
hand and torts and contract on the other. Moreover, one has no 
ground, on that account, for public-regarding sanctions. Any argu-
ment adequate to establish the justifiability of such sanctions-even if 
it is expressed in terms of the state's duty to enforce morality or Divine 
Law-will, it seems, be some version of a social harm argument. Simi-
larly for straight social utility arguments. They either concern recti-
fying or preventing disutility consequent to the wrongs done, in which 
case they are social harm arguments; or else they concern simple ex-
pediency for the political/legal process, in which case both the list of 
crimes we have and the public-regarding sanctions we have appear 
bizarre. 
So if there is a rational justification for the public law response to 
what we call crimes, it appears that it must be some version of the 
standard legal thesis that crimes are social harms. I say "some version" 
of the thesis because just anything which harms the community can-
not plaUSibly be a candidate for the crime category. In general, the 
law restricts the social harms involved to those produced by inten-
tional, malicious conduct which is aimed at doing (or tends to do) 
4th ed. revised [St. Paul, 1968], p. 443). See also pp. 1-14 of the standard horn-
book on the substantive criminal law, LaFave and Scott, Handbook on Criminal 
Law (St. Paul, 1972). 
Such definitions are also commonplace in the cases: "All such acts or attempts 
as tend to the prejudice of the community are indictable" (R. v. Higgins [1801] 
2 East 5). ''The common law is sufficiently broad to punish as a misdemeanor 
... any act which directly injures or tends to injure the public to such an extent 
as to require the state to interfere ... " (Commonwealth v. Mochan 177 Pa. Super. 
454, IIO A. 2nd 788). There has been much judicial discussion of the proper 
scope of such pronouncements, but that this approach to what makes an act 
criminal is the correct one does not seem to be in dispute. 
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physical or financial damage to persons or property, and "wanton" or 
"willful" negligence which shows a "reckless or indifferent disregard" 
of the health and safety of others.14 The explication of the social harm 
argument must account for why these sorts of social harm-and not 
those produced by "lesser" negligence, for example-justify a pub-
lic law response. As noted previously, it is not likely that the whole 
list of things the law currently defines as criminal can be justified on 
some such ground. The law has grown too randomly to make such an 
expectation reasonable.15 This need not destroy the importance of the 
point, however, that the main body of criminal wrongs can be under-
stood in terms of a social harm principle. 
What makes all this interesting in the case of criminal attempt is 
that jUrisprudents in favor of lesser penalties for attempts appear to 
forget their own theory of criminal wrongs when they make the un-
equal harm argument [(3) above]. When they argue for the lesser 
penalty on the basis of penalties proportional to the harm done, they 
are clearly referring to the harm done to the individual victims, since 
they treat the point about lesser harm resulting from attempts as an 
obvious one-as a truism requiring no argument. The issue of whether 
less social (Le., criminal) harm is done by attempts than by completed 
crimes is of course not nearly so clear. It is not clear partly because 
the sort of social harm at stake in the distinction between criminal 
and tortious wrongs is rarely made explicit. I intend to make it ex-
plicit below, but the first correction to be made to arguments about 
criminal attempt is simply this: that they must show that attempts 
produce less specifically criminal harm than do completed crimes. 
But is this true of attempts? I think not, even though an affirmative 
answer has some plausibility. The plausibility rests on a mistaken no-
tion of the sort of social harm the criminal law is specifically aimed at. 
Consider the following (erroneous) line of argument: A mere attempt 
on the life of Robert Kennedy during his campaign (even if, like the 
14. See the definition of criminal negligence in Bell v. Commonwealth, 170 
Va. 597; 195 S.E. 675 at 68I. 
15. In fact, as Fitzgerald actually argues, to "explain" the whole list we are 
forced to say simply that "whether or not any conduct constitutes a crime . . . 
depends solely on whether or not such conduct has been proscribed as criminal 
by the law. The hallmark of criminality is that it is a breach of the criminal law" 
(Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment, p. 7). 
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attempt on George Wallace, its effect had been to cripple him and stop 
his candidacy) would have been much less socially damaging than 
what actually happened. Indeed, the differences in the public re-
sponses to both actual events are, in part, an example of the ways in 
which we may say that a killing does more social damage than a crip-
pling. In the former case there was a great deal more public turmoil 
(desire for revenge, dislocation of the political structure, violation of 
expectations, frustration of desires) which had to be dealt with than in 
the latter. The reasons for this are no doubt to be found in people's 
reactions to the amount of harm suffered by the victims (and in their 
attitudes toward the victims). Furthermore, of course, in the former 
case, the victim was lost to society forever, while in the latter case, he 
can still contribute, even if at a reduced level. In short, since an at-
tempt does less social (criminal) harm than a completed crime, it can 
reasonably be punished less severely. 
This sort of argument will not do, however. Mter all, if we are to 
determine the severity of the penalty on the basis of the sorts of social 
harm this argument refers to, then we must distinguish among at-
tempts as well as between attempts and successes, for some attempts 
do much more of the sort of social damage referred to than do others. 
And we would be forced to distinguish various attempts on a basis 
which violates one of the most firmly justified controlling principles 
of law. Mter all, an attempt on the life of a gangster will presumably 
do less social damage than the same sort of attempt on the life of a 
beloved public figure. To distinguish them on that basis would put us 
in the untenable position of having to decide, perhaps as a matter of 
statute, how much to punish an offender on the basis of how "popular" 
and socially useful his victim happened to be. Clearly this would vio-
late, at a minimum, one of our most deeply felt and thoroughly justi-
fied moral and legal principles: that of equal protection under the law. 
For if anyone who is contemplating murdering me knows that his 
penalty will be next to nothing compared to that of someone who kills, 
or tries to kill, Martin Luther King (because, in terms of the sorts of 
social value at issue here, I am next to nothing compared to Martin 
Luther King), then the law hardly protects me at all, let alone equally. 
The initial plausibility of this interpretation of criminal harm, then, 
falls away sharply when its consequences are made plain. 
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There is, however, a sort of social harm which is at the root of 
criminality and which argues strongly for treating not only all "at-
tempters" alike (regardless of the status of their victims and the 
amount of harm done to them) but also argues for treating at least 
some attempts with the same severity as completions. This is the social 
harm done, the social volatility, if you like, consequent to the process 
of doing the major sorts of conduct we punish criminally.16 
To explain: when a person is killed by accident, we respond very 
differently than we do to a premeditated murder or to voluntary or 
involuntary manslaughter. More exactly, our normal responses to ac-
cidents, regardless of intensity, regardless of the amount of damage 
done to victims or to SOciety at large, are not socially volatile. That is, 
they do not have the potential for destructive disturbance of funda-
mental social structures to be found in our responses to intentional, 
malicious harms, or even to extreme negligence. What calls forth a 
socially volatile response to the latter sorts of acts is their relation to 
what might be called socially unstable character traits. To wit: 
Let us define perfect social stability as that state of affairs in which 
everyone always acts in ways which are "socially justifiable" (Le., in 
ways which are at least consistent with the maintenance of social 
coherence, social institutions and the systems of mutual expectations 
necessary for the productivity of the members of sOciety). Perfect so-
cial stability is no doubt only approachable as a limit, and indeed may 
not even be a desirable achievement. But it is clear that it is not even 
approachable unless each of us can have assurance that his person 
and activities will not be unjustifiably interfered with by others. For 
insofar as I do not possess such assurance, my own criteria for deci-
sion-making will (only rationally) include the prospect of abandoning 
my own SOcially stable behavior in self-defense. This is what I describe 
16. While unconventional, the approach developed here is anticipated by some 
remarks of Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law II, p. 503, with regard 
to the law of treason. In discussing treason law prior to its crystallization into an 
elaborate statute in 1352 (25 Edw. III, stat. 5, cap. 2), and specifically those 
parts of it which penalize conspiracies, "compassing" the king's death, and the 
like, they say: " ... in marked contrast to the general drift of our old criminal 
law, the crime was in this case found, not in a harmful result, but in the en-
deavour to produce it ... " (emphasis added). 
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as a volatile response, and its community-wide occurrence is social 
volatility. 
Assurance about the justifiable behavior of others depends upon be-
liefs or assumptions about, and consequent trust in, their dispositions 
to behave in justifiable ways-that is, on belief in their not having 
socially unstable character traits. There are, of course, many kinds of 
such traits. The disposition to break one's promise whenever it is con-
venient is one, and a harmful one. Promise-breaking can do social as 
well as personal damage, and its spread community-wide would cer-
tainly create a socially volatile situation. But individual instances of 
promise-breaking are not, at least in our society, typically productive 
of social volatility. X may break his promise to Y, and Y may kill 
him for it (surely a personally volatile response), but it is typically 
the killing, and not the breaking of the promise, which produces the 
community-wide volatility. The most malicious, deceitful dealing imag-
inable may tum a family out in the cold, but the typical public re-
sponse is an affirmation of socially stable behavior (through, for ex-
ample, public support for the family and scorn for the wrongdoer), 
and not a chain reaction breakdown of such behavior in self-defenseY 
Some unstable traits, thus, get a socially volatile response while 
others do not. And social volatility is to be regarded as a disvalue in 
itself, the creation of which, by acts produced by an individual's so-
cially unstable character traits, is a social harm. It is this sort of social 
harm, I want to argue, which justifies the public law response we 
make by defining the acts involved as criminal. And it is the absence 
of such harm, together with the other arguments which support mens 
rea and actus reus requirements, which justifiably excludes some 
wrongs from the category of a crime. Similarly, it is the (supposed) 
absence of such harm which alone could justify leaving intentional, 
but yet personally and socially harmful, breaches of contract to private 
law. 
I7. The law sometimes recognizes this in a big way in its handling of rescue 
cases. See, for example, the incredible case of Yania v. Bigan 347 Pa. 3I6; I55 
A. 2nd 343 (I959) in which Bigan "enticed, taunted and inveigled" Yania to 
jump into a trench ten feet deep in water, and then stood by doing nothing while 
Yania drowned. Bigan was not even held civilly liable, let alone criminally 
liable. 
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The interpretation of criminal harm as the harm consequent to the 
social volatility of conduct thus makes a good deal of sense out of the 
current list of things defined as criminal, the list of things defined as 
noncriminal, and the insistence of jurisprudents that social harm is 
the issue at stake in justifying the two lists as they (mostly) stand.18 
It also, of course, gives some rationale (however inadequate) for the 
general absence of reparation-to-the-victim in criminal sanctions. 
Reparation for the amount of harm done to the victims is not a part 
of the logic of opting for a public law response at all. Thus the criminal 
penalties for murder and for negligent manslaughter may justifiably 
be different, even though the harm to the victims is the same. And the 
penalties for attempts and completed crimes need not be different, 
merely on the ground of a difference in the amount of harm to the 
victims. 
Two things are important to keep in mind, however, about this line 
of argument. First, the sorts of socially unstable character traits which 
produce a socially volatile response probably vary considerably from 
culture to culture. Which traits produce such a response in any given 
time and place is an empirical issue, and one to be taken seriously by 
any proposal for law reform. Second, the amount of social volatility 
(and consequent harm) produced by various types of crimes is also an 
empirical issue, though I want to argue that there is no reason in 
general for thinking it to be less for attempts than for successes. 
With these two cautions in mind, we may proceed. The argument 
against the general conclusion that attempts should be punished less 
severely than successes may be put briefly as follows. Once we ac-
knowledge that it is social harm which is specifically criminal, then 
we must recognize that the sort of social harm involved is precisely 
the harm consequent to the social volatility of the conduct at issue. It 
is this sort of social harm for which we punish a person's successful 
18. There are notable exceptions. There are, for example, regions of both 
strict and vicarious liability in the criminal law. The concept of criminality 
developed here will not apply to them. But I think these cases may be safely 
ignored for present purposes. They do not represent the major thrust of the 
criminal law, and there is nearly continuous, vigorous debate over the justifi-
ability of such laws (as one would expect, were the theory proposed here the 
correct explication of the distinction). 
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criminal conduct. And it is the same sort of social harm for which we 
punish criminal attempts. Now it seems plausible to suppose that, at 
least for many sorts of crimes, no less of such harm is done by at-
tempts then by successes, for the breakdown of the assurance of social 
stability (Le., of one agent's contribution toward it) is complete once 
the attempt has been made, and made known. A rash of public shoot-
ings, successful or not, are socially volatile. I see no reason to suppose 
that attempts are, in general, any less "public," and thus less produc-
tive of social harm, than successes. Some attempts, such as the one 
on George Wallace's life, are more public than nearly all successful 
murders, while some murders are never discovered by anyone and thus 
cannot do any of the sort of social harm at issue here. These vagaries, 
and others like them, must be ignored for present purposes. Just as it 
is unjustifiable to make the severity of the penalty depend on the 
prominence or social usefulness of the victim, so it would be unjusti-
fiable to make the penalty depend on the amount of subsequent pub-
licity produced at the discretion of news agencies; or, indeed, to make 
it depend on the degree of success a criminal has in keeping things 
quiet. Once we have decided on a public law response to certain 
wrongs, and decided roughly how much social harm (conditions of 
public information being equal) each type of wrongdoing causes, 
principles of equal treatment and advance notice require the sort of 
variables mentioned above to be disregarded. When this is done, there 
is no difficulty in seeing that the killer who fails because his bullet 
accidently hits his victim's belt buckle is no less a social menace in 
the requisite sense than one who succeeds because his victim happens 
to be wearing suspenders. 
The usual rationale for treating attempts, in general, less severely 
than successes thus breaks down: attempts are seen as presumptively 
equal in social harm to successes; the principles of proportionality and 
similar treatment for similar cases thus require that, unless the pre-
sumption is rebutted, attempts be treated equally with successes, and 
combined with the admittedly equal needs of the attempters and the 
successful for reform [the reform argument (I) above], the deterrence 
argument [( 2) above] is overwhelmed. 
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As a convenient way of advancing additional arguments for it, I want 
now to consider a set of objections to the theory of criminal wrongs 
just presented. 
A. Confusion of General Justifying Principle with Regulative Prin-
ciples. It might be urged that the construction of an elaborate theory 
of social volatility to supplant a perfectly straightforward theory of 
social harm suggested by the Kennedy-Wallace example is based on a 
simple confusion. It might be maintained that the general justification 
for treating X as a public law matter is indeed its potential for social 
harm of the "usual" sort (e.g., the "costs" to society, etc.), but what 
controls the grading of the particular sort of offense is the amount of 
harm done to the victim, just as what controls the amount of punish-
ment meted out to a particular offender is (or ought to be) its utility 
for reform and deterrence. Thus there is no problem with differential 
punishments depending on how "popular" one's victim happens to be. 
The general principle controls only the public-law Iprivate-Iaw deci-
sion; other principles regulate the grading of offenses and sentencing. 
There is much that could be said in response to such an objection, 
but it will suffice to produce the sort of counterexample which can be 
generalized. On the theory advanced by this objection, premeditated 
murder and motor vehicle homicide must be graded at the same level. 
We typically think (for good reasons, I believe) not only that both of-
fenses are properly public law matters (as this theory also would have 
it), but that they are not offenses of equal "criminal" gravity. But if 
offenses are to be graded on the basis of the amount of harm done to 
the victim(s ), then the two forms of homicide cannot, on that basis, be 
distinguished. This counterexample has a structure which can be filled 
in many ways. Generally speaking, it shows that the objection ignores 
what we typically take (quite justifiably, I believe) to be a crucial ele-
ment in the grading of crimes-mens rea. It cannot be repaired by im-
porting intent into the grading process, for that simply raises the ques-
tion of why intent is a crucial factor-and that question leads directly 
to the sort of social harm argument I propose. How can intent be the 
factor which controls our decision to classify a given act as criminal? 
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Only, it seems, if intentional wrongdoing is socially damaging in a 
way that other sorts are not. What could such a way be, if not through 
social volatility? 
B. Having It Both Ways. It might also be urged, however, that the 
"usuaY' sort of social harm was faulted for violating a cherished prin-
ciple of justice (equal protection) while a similar failing of the new 
interpretation of social harm was passed over smoothly. If the new 
interpretation can be shored up by introducing a principle which 
"holds" publicity equal for instances of a given crime (in order to meet 
the requirements of justice), then surely the "usual" interpretation 
can be shored up in a similar way. So what reason is there' for opting 
for one interpretation over the other? 
The reply here may also be brief. The equal protection problem is 
a difficulty for the usual interpretation of the social harm argument, 
but alone it is not decisive. What is decisive is that in addition to this 
difficulty, the usual interpretation-just as is so, ultimately, for objec-
tion A above-cannot give an account of why mens rea is a crucial ele-
ment in the grading of crimes. To do so it would have to invoke a 
theory of social volatility, and once that is done (and the harm conse-
quent to the status of the victim is held constant for reasons of equal 
protection), one doesn't have the "usual" interpretation at all, but in 
effect at least, the one I propose. To see this clearly, one need only ask 
how one could account, on the usual theory, for treating injuries pro-
duced negligently differently than the same injuries intentionally and 
maliciously produced.19 
C. Oversimplification. The theory of criminal wrong presented here 
may also be attacked as oversimplified. Even granting that the ration-
ale for the public law response to certain wrongs may have to be elab-
I9. It might be noted that in tort law, as well as criminal law, intentional 
wrongs are distinguished in important ways from negligent ones. For one thing, 
victims of intentional torts are able to collect punitive or exemplary damages. 
In addition they need not always be able to show actual injury from the wrong, 
whereas such a showing is a necessary part of an action for negligence. And in 
some cases, time limitations on the initiation of an action are more generous 
to victims of intentional torts than to victims of negligence. See Charles O. 
Gregory and Harry Kalven, Jr., Cases and Materials on Torts, 2nd ed. (Boston, 
I969) p. 23. Whether the rationale for this difference is in any way related to 
the concept of social volatility is unclear. 
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orated along those lines, it surely is obvious that the criminal law-even 
for intentional and malicious injuries-has a much more complex so-
cial function than that. We take the administration of justice out of the 
hands of injured parties to prevent blood feuds and the vicious self per-
petuating cycles of revenge they spawn. This we find socially necessary, 
just as we find it necessary to go further and make prosecutions a 
matter of public initiative. But we must recognize the tendency these 
necessary steps have to impart a sense of frustration and alienation 
to the injured parties and to the sympathetic public at large. A vicious 
crime is committed, and immediately upon the capture of the culprit 
the engines of justice start to grind in virtual isolation from those most 
profoundly concerned. The outraged public is an impotent spectator; 
the victim is at best a mere source of evidence. Yet precisely in terms 
of the sort of social volatility described above, this sense of frustra-
tion and alienation can be the source of Significant social instability. 
So we punish to reform and to deter, certainly. But we also must punish 
to satisfy the desire for retaliation felt by victims of crime and to 
satisfy the public outrage generated by those crimes. Thus, the logic 
of reparation and retaliation must remain very much a part of the 
criminal law. The severity of penalties must reflect that logiC. Does 
this not mean, then, that equal penalties for attempts and successes 
would be viewed as excessive-and perhaps further aggravate the 
sense that the criminal law is something alien and unresponsive to 
the needs of those most directly concerned?20 
The answer to the question must be, I think, no. The places where 
the logic of retaliation becomes a factor in the grading of crimes are 
(i) where the penalties dictated by the grading are less than what is 
needed for retributive satisfaction; and (ii) where the penalties dic-
tated by the grading are felt to be excessive. In either of those cases, 
one can imagine social instability arising. But clearly neither of those 
cases obtain for attempts if the analysis I propose is correct. In terms 
of reform, a penalty equal to that for success is indicated, and the 
proposed analysis of criminal harm supports equalization in general. 
Unless the penalty for success is too low for retributive satisfaction, 
20. For a similar argument in favor of lesser penalties for attempts, see 
Wechsler and Michael, "A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II," Columbia Law 
Review 37 (1937): 1290-1298. 
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there is no way the proposal for equalization could result in damage 
under (i) above. Further, the proposed analysis of criminal harm 
argues against the view that the equalization of penalties is excessive 
by providing grounds for a presumptive claim of the equal social 
harm of attempts and successes. It is true that if one considers only 
the physical harm done to the victims, the equalization proposal may 
seem excessive. But we need not suppose that people are so unsophisti-
cated as to believe that that is the only harm crimes do. And once it 
is shown that in terms of specifically criminal harm attempts and 
successes do equal damage, what ground is there for supposing that 
there would be any social outcry from retributivists for giving the two 
crimes equal criminal penalties? We may, I think, lay this objection 
aside with the others. 
D. The Need for Evidence. It may be objected, however, that 
throughout the whole discussion of social harm, social volatility and 
the like, a number of crucial issues have been settled a priori which 
really stand in need of empirical evidence. This, it may be urged, is 
especially true of the claim that attempts are no less socially volatile 
than successful crimes. How can one know such a thing a priori? 
And until one knows it, mustn't the whole proposal for reform of 
attempt law stand in abeyance? 
This is an objection to be taken seriously, and indeed it does weaken 
the proposal regarding criminal attempt. It does not, of course, strike 
at the analysis of what is at stake in justifying the criminal/non-
criminal distinction, but that does not allow one to bypass it in a dis-
cussion of the applicability of the analysis to this region of the crim-
inallaw. 
Two things need to be said. First, the amount of social harm done 
by attempts as opposed to successes is an empirical issue, and it is 
plaUSible to suppose that attempts at certain sorts of minor crimes 
might well be a significantly lesser source of the requisite sort of 
social harm than successes. I do not deny this, and would not dispute 
a decision to grade such attempts a notch (or several notches) below 
the corresponding successes. I have merely argued that there is no 
reason to suppose that, in general, attempts do less criminal harm than 
successes, and that we may thus establish a rebuttable presumption 
in favor of equal penalties. 
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Even so, it may asked whether this is not based on an indefensibly 
a priori judgment. This leads to the second point which must be made. 
I do not think the difficulty raised here must be regarded as decisive, 
when one notices that some issues which are nominally empirical 
really present no discoverable need for empirical investigation. A 
good case in point is the contention that attempters stand no less in 
need of reform than successful criminals (at least if their failure is 
due to ineptness or intervening circumstances). For it is reform of 
dispositions, behavior patterns, motivation and the like which is at 
stake, and what reason is there for supposing that there is a significant 
difference in such factors between attempters and the successful? 
Likewise (though I admit, less conclusively) there seems to be little 
discoverable need for empirical confirmation of the point that an 
attempted armed robbery on a downtown street is just as disconcert-
ing to passersby as a successful one, and that an increase in the 
number of such attempts would cause just as much apprehensiveness 
in people as would a corresponding increase in successes. One may 
imagine a bizarre society in which practically no attempts at any 
crime ever succeeded or did any harm to anyone, and so people were 
more bemused by such happenings than alarmed by them. But that is 
certainly not our situation. And so I think this objection, too, can be 
laid aside. 
IV 
The analysis of social harm, its adequacy as a principle for making 
the criminal/noncriminal distinction, and its applicability in principle 
to the reform of criminal attempt law have probably been discussed 
sufficiently for present purposes. No actual application of such an 
analysis to the law, however, can end with such an abstract discus-
sion. So in this section and the next, I want to take up a number of 
objections which might be raised, not about the applicability of the 
analysis "in the abstract," but about its relation to a whole set of con-
crete problems in the law-especially, but not exclUSively, in the area 
of criminal attempts. 
A. The Difficulty of Distinguishing Attempt from Mere Preparation. 
It is notoriously difficult to draw a hard and fast line between acts 
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merely preparatory to the commission of a crime and an actual at-
tempt. It may be urged that to exact the same penalties for attempt 
as for completion thus puts too much strain on decisions which are 
often shaky anyway, and the result might be both a significant amount 
of injustice (the very severe penalization of people who could reason-
ably have been held to be merely preparing to commit a crime, and 
thus innocent of any criminal offense), and-to borrow a phrase from 
Justice Frankfurter-the consequent sensationalization of the judicial 
process with respect to trials for attempt. This is a serious enough 
argument to require an extended examination. 
Mere preparation, of course, is not an offense in either the common 
law or the penal codes which have sprung from it. This is so, appar-
ently, for two reasons, both similar to the reasons for not punishing 
mere intent: first, the difficulty, in most merely preparatory stages, 
of proving that the actions involved were really directed toward ful-
filling a criminal intent (after all, one may buy poison for any number 
of reasons); and second, the fact that one may always abandon 
his criminal purpose during the preparatory stage, thus correcting his 
own behavior and rendering punishment unjustifiable, while once he 
has attempted the crime, it seems by definition too late to claim re-
nunciation of the intent as an excuse-no more than one can claim 
renunciation as an excuse upon completion of the crime. 
The problem is, however, in deciding at what point, in the series of 
steps leading towards the completion of the crime, an actual attempt 
has been made. Some cases are clear: firing a gun at a man's head 
with intent to murder is surely an attempt at murder. Going to a gun-
shop to choose a weapon for murder is clearly still at the stage of 
preparation. But consider: 
( a) A man met a fourteen-year-old boy in a park, took him to a 
cafe and bought him ice cream. They then walked back to the park, 
where the man sat with the boy on a bench, put his arm around him, 
made indecent gestures to him, and engaged in indecent conversation 
with him. He suggested to the boy that they sleep out together in the 
park, and although he did not actually suggest participating in in-
decent conduct, asked the boy to meet him in the park the next night 
and promised him money, a walk and a movie if he did so. The next 
night the boy met him and was told it was too late for the movie but 
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that they should take a walk together. At this point the man was 
arrested and charged with attempting to procure the boy to commit 
an act of gross indecency. He argued that his conduct did not con-
stitute an attempt, but at most merely preparation.21 
(b) A man was talking with his employer about getting a raise, and 
in the course of the conversation, began to pull a revolver from his 
pocket. Before he could raise his arm, however, the employer grabbed 
him. During the struggle, in which he was eventually disarmed with-
out having fired, he said several times to the employer, "You've got 
to die." He was charged with attempting to discharge a loaded revolver 
with intent to do grievous bodily harm. It was objected on his behalf 
that his acts did not constitute evidence of attempt.22 . 
( c) A jeweler who had insured his stock against theft concealed 
some of it in a recess under his safe, then tied himself up and called 
for help. When the police came, he told them he had locked up, gone 
upstairs and been knocked down and tied up by someone. The safe 
was found open and empty. The police were not satisfied with the 
story, and after searching the store, found the hidden merchandise. 
Told of this, the jeweler confessed to having hoped to get insurance 
money for the "stolen" goods. He was charged with attempting to 
obtain money under false pretenses. He argued that at most his con-
duct was preparatory:23 
( d) A man constructed and arranged combustibles in a building 
with intent to commit arson in order to "injure the insurers" of the 
building and its contents. The combustibles were ready to be lighted, 
but on his way back to the building to do it-when he was some quarter 
of a mile away-he changed his mind and drove away. He was arrested 
for attempting to burn the building and injure the insurers. He argued 
that his acts were merely preparatory.24 
21. R. v. Miskell (I953) 37 Cr. App. R. 2I4. He was convicted and his appeal 
dismissed. 
22. R. v. Linneker [I906] 2 K.B. 99. He was convicted, and the conviction was 
affirmed on appeal. 
23. R. v. Robinson (I9I5) II Cr. App. R. I24. He was convicted, but on appeal 
it was held that his acts were not enough to constitute an attempt and his con-
viction was quashed. 
24. Commonwealth of Mass. v. Peaslee I77 Mass. 267; 59 N.E. 55 (I90I). He 
was convicted, and on appeal the court suggested, but declined to decide, that 
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(e) A group of anned men cruised the streets of an area of New 
York City, looking for a particular payroll clerk whom they intended 
to rob of about $1200. Their futile efforts to find the clerk led to their 
surveillance and arrest by the police. They were charged with at-
tempted robbery. They argued that their acts did not constitute 
attempt. 25 
These cases illustrate adequately, I think, the difficulty courts have 
had in drawing the line between preparation and attempt. From time 
to time there have been attempts to enunciate a general principle for 
making the distinction, and there has been some progress in the sense 
that a number of obvious candidates for a distinguishing principle 
have been found inadequate. At least it may be said that the defi-
nitions of attempt now offered are a good deal more sophisticated 
than, for example, the untenably narrow principle that the accused 
must have done all that was necessary to actually commit the crime 
to be guilty of an attempt. 26 Even Salmond failed to provide an ade-
quate formulation: 
An act done with intent to commit a crime is not a criminal attempt 
unless it is of such a nature as to be in itself sufficient evidence of 
the criminal intent with which it is done. A criminal attempt is an 
act which shows criminal intent on the face of it. The case must 
be one in which res ipsa loquitur. An act, on the other hand, which 
is in its own nature and on the face of it innocent is not a criminal 
attempt. 27 
Clearly, though, it is not so much what we see (Le., the act) as what 
we know (about the intent) which determines whether we regard 
something as an attempt, and information on that can come from 
sources other than the act-for example, from a confession. The act 
the evidence was sufficient for a conviction for attempt. Instead it reversed the 
conviction on an unrelated procedural ground. 
25. People v. Rizzo 246 N.Y. 334; 158 N.E. 888 (1927). They were convicted, 
but on appeal the conviction was reversed on the ground that their acts consti-
tuted mere preparation. 
26. Enunciated by Parke, B. in R. v. Eagleton 6 Cox C.C. 559. This was thrown 
out in R. v. White [19101 2 KB. 124 where it was held that the giving of the first 
dose of pOison in series intended to cause death was attempted murder. 
27. In R. v. Barker [19241 N.Z.L.R. 865. 
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of turning the wheel which opens the sluice gates of a dam is am-
biguous. Did the actor think he was opening the gates (thus intend-
ing to let the water out)? Or did he think he was making sure the 
gates were closed? We cannot determine criminal intent merely from 
this act. Yet if the actor later confessed an intent to open the gates 
to flood the town, it would surely be odd to have to say that because 
res ipsa loquitur non, he was not guilty of attempt. 
As a result of the failures of general formulas, statutory definitions 
of attempt have had to rely on vague formulations-for example, to 
the effect that the criminal intent must be clear and the act toward 
accomplishing the crime must be a "substantial step" toward the com-
mission of the crime which is "strongly corroborative of the actor's 
criminal purpose."28 One then relies on examples-drawn, naturally 
enough, from the cases-to illustrate the meaning of "substantial step" 
and "strongly corroborative."29 But it must be admitted that such 
"definitions" of attempt are no more than guidelines; they are by no 
means an exhaustive statement of the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for attempts. 
In the face of this difficulty, then, the argument may be pressed that 
increasing the penalties for attempts to the level of the penalties for 
completed crimes-especially in the case of first degree felonies, for 
which the most severe penalties are exacted-demands a level of cer-
tainty in distinguishing preparation from attempt which simply can-
not be achieved. 
The reply to this argument must be made in several stages. First, 
it should be noted that preparation/attempt is not the only distinction 
in the criminal law which it is difficult to draw with precision. And 
if we were to step down the penalties for crimes on the basis of the 
"degree of difficulty" involved in determining whether they have been 
committed, a number of unfortunate things would result. For one 
thing, all crimes involving proof of intent would per se be subject 
to a similar argument concerning "strain on a difficult distinction," 
28. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. IO (1960) 
§S.oI(1). 
29. For example, from the Model Penal Code, op. cit., § 5.01 (2): examples 
of "substantial steps": "(a) lying in wait, searching for or follOwing the con-
templated victim of the crime; (b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated 
victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission. . . ." 
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for it is clear that if preparation vs. attempt is a difficult distinction 
for the law to draw, conceptually, the existence/nonexistence of mens 
rea is an even more difficult one, if not to draw, then at least to apply. 
Yet that distinction is utterly fundamental to nearly all major criminal 
proceedings. 
Further, and closer to the subject at hand, the distinction between 
attempt and completion itself-upon which the present law depends 
for deciding the level of penalties to be assigned-is sometimes the 
subject of dispute. Suppose X hits Y on the head with an ax, intend-
ing to murder him. Thinking Y dead (which he is not), X then throws 
him off a cliff, or down an ant-bear hole, or into a river, in order to 
hide his body. The second act is what actually kills Y. Now, X claims 
that his intent to kill Y was extant only during the first act (hitting 
Y on the head), and since that did not succeed, he can only be charged 
with attempted murder. Mter all, the act that actually killed Y was 
not intended to kill him at all, hence not itself an attempt at-or rather 
success at-murder. 30 
Difficulties in distinction-making are pervasive in the law, and while 
we should not needlessly add to the list of difficulties, the reform of 
the law of attempt suggested here is not such a needless addition. 
If it is agreed for any class of crimes, in accord with the argument 
in II above, that attempts and successes are eqUivalent criminal 
wrongs, then the extension of equal treatment to both is hardly "need-
less." On the contrary, it-and it alone-satisfies one of the most funda-
mental principles of justice: that of equal treatment for relevantly 
similar cases. And while it may "add" to a problem of proof, it also 
"subtracts" from one: it eliminates the importance of making the sort 
of discrimination between attempt and success striven for in the cases 
just mentioned. 
Borderline cases of attempt would, under the reform suggested, be 
dealt with much as borderline cases of intent are presently dealt with. 
If there is reasonable doubt that the act constitutes an attempt (com-
30. There are at least four such cases on the books. In one, Thabo Meli et al. v. 
R. [I954] I W.L.R. 228; I AlI E.R. 373, the accused was convicted of murder. In 
the other three (R. v. Khandu [I890] T.L.R. IS Born. I94; R. v. Shorty [I950] 
S.R. 280; R. v. Chiswibo [I96I] 2 S.A. 714) the accused were convicted only of 
attempt. 
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pare: an intended, malicious injury), then it is treated as mere prep-
aration (compare: mere accident) and not punished criminally. If 
this has the effect of acquitting some reprehensible people who would 
otherwise-under the lighter penalty for attempt-have been punished 
at least a little bit, then so be it. This is perfectly consistent with the 
fundamental principles of the standards of proof required in criminal 
cases.a1 
In fact, it would be distressing to think that standards of proof can 
justifiably be lowered in the case of attempt as long as the penalties 
are kept significantly lower than those for successful crimes. And this 
is really what, underneath it all, the argument being dis~ussed here is 
saying: that we need not be worried about making the wrong decisions 
on borderline preparation/attempt cases as long as the penalties for 
attempts are kept low. Such feelings may be justified in some cases 
of distinction-making in the criminal law (the reverse-the increased 
concern about getting things right-is surely warranted in the case 
of capital crimes). But where the issue is one of conviction as opposed 
to acquittal, as it is in the preparation/attempt cases, we cannot allow 
31. It has been suggested by at least one eminent legal writer that we might 
do well to make certain unambiguous preparations (which clearly fall short of 
attempts) criminal in themselves. See Glanville Williams, "Police Control of 
Intending Criminals," Criminal Law Review 66 (1965); and by the same author, 
in Criminal Law: The General Part, pp. 632-633. And it may be noted that Soviet 
law does just that. See Article 15 of Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation for 
the USSR (official text in translation) (Moscow, 1960). This is a much more 
radical change than that suggested here for the law of attempt, however, and I 
am very sceptical, to say the least, about its justifiability. It would, no doubt, 
allow us to deal more adequately with some frustrating cases (e.g., People v. 
Rizzo, cited above). But the danger is, of course, that it would reach too far 
back toward mere intent. Everyone will doubtless agree that mere imaginative 
rehearsals (as distinct from intent) ought not to be made criminal. And punish-
ment for mere intent is held by most to be similarly incompatible with the 
principles of a free society. But it may also be that if we are to treat our fellows 
as free, moral agents, we need to allow them more latitude in the process of 
deciding right from wrong than that. It may be that we need to respect the 
possibility of renunciation of criminal purpose enough not to reach back further 
than an actual attempt. Merely making renunciation of intent an affirmative 
defense (as Soviet law does: see Article 16 of the Fundamentals) does not an-
swer this objection. It is the widest possible opportunity for renunciation which 
is at stake, and it is clear that persons who could not have gone through with 
even an attempt might well be caught before they had "had a chance" to change 
their minds. 
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ourselves the comfort of thinking that the problem can be minimized 
by keeping the penalties for attempt one notch lower than those for 
success. If there is reasonable doubt as to whether an act is criminal 
at all (Le., in this case, should count as preparation or attempt), the 
benefit should fall to the accused, just as it does when there is reason-
able doubt that he actually intended to harm his victim. And if there 
is no reasonable doubt as to whether the act is an attempt or not, the 
decision will be obvious. In either case, the severity of the penalty for 
attempt is not at issue. The reasons which justify the reasonable doubt 
rule for criminal cases are well enough known not to require repetition 
here. 
In short, then, we may confidently dismiss the objection resting on 
the difficulty of distinguishing attempt from preparation. There are, 
however, some further objections to consider. 
B. The Half-hearted Attempt. It may be argued that, just as some 
attempts at suicide are really not attempts at all, but calls for help, 
so some attempts at crimes are properly regarded as "something else" : 
for example, as the working ouf of a desire, for whatever reason, to 
be caught. Some criminals are caught in attempts so often that it is 
hard for those intimately connected with them to interpret their be-
havior in any other way. It would be wrong, this argument goes, to 
punish such "attempts" equally with successful crimes, since the actor 
was not really trying to commit the crime so much as to get attention. 
The reply to this, of course, is that if a distinction in penalties is 
. to be made for those who attempt crimes for such motives, then it 
should also be made for those whose attempts (for those motives) 
just happen to succeed. If there are half-hearted attempts, there are 
half-hearted successes as well. They should be treated alike. Whether, 
then, the category of "half-hearted crimes" should receive lesser penal-
ties than "whole-hearted" ones is a separate issue, and does not affect 
the outcome of the proposal for reforming attempt law put forward 
here. 
C. The Encouragement of Second Thoughts. Another objection 
which might be raised against the proposal, however, is that having 
lesser penalties for attempt encourages "second thoughts" during the 
commission of some crimes. Equalizing the penalties for attempts 
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and completions eliminates one motive a person may have for stop-
ping in the middle of an attempt, should he suddenly change his mind 
about the wisdom of what he is doing. Thus the lesser penalty may 
be a better deterrent in this case than the greater one. 
A fairly straightforward response to this is that if we want to en-
courage second thoughts (i.e., abandonment of criminal purpose be-
fore the crime has been completed), we can do this directly, without 
regard to the relative severity of penalties for attempts and completed 
crimes, by making renunciation of intent an affirmative defense and/ 
or an admissible ground for mitigation. This is surely a much more 
rational way of dealing with the problem than by simply excusing 
from the heavier penalty all whose attempts fail to come off-for what-
ever reason. As it stands now, the person who gives up in the middle 
of the attempt merely out of fatigue, or because he is interrupted by 
the arrival of the police, is given the same penalty as one who has 
given up because he has come to see the wrongfulness of his behavior. 
Certainly in terms of the reformative aims of criminal sanctions, as 
well as in terms of the amount of specifically criminal harm (social 
volatility) produced, the genuine repentance must be distinguished 
from attempts which fail for other reasons.32 
32. Making renunciation of intent an affirmative defense has its difficulties, 
of course. Authorities are clear that "involuntary" abandonment of attempt (as 
when a police patrol spots the activity and moves in, forcing the attempters to 
run) cannot reasonably be a defense. But although voluntary abandonment is 
also often said to fail as a defense, there are cases in which it has been accepted. 
See, for example, People v. von Hecht 133 Cal. App. 2d 25; 282 P.2d 764 (1953); 
and Weaver v. State (of Georgia) lI6 Ga. 550; 42 S.E. 745 (1902). For a review 
of the authorities, see Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 10 (1960), §5.01. 
The Model Penal Code, op. cit., §5.01(4) recommends that renunciation of 
intent be an affirmative defense if it is "complete and voluntary." On the mean-
ing of "complete and voluntary," it says: "renunciation of criminal purpose is 
not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present 
or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the 
probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the ac-
complishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is moti-
vated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous 
time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim." 
In 1967, New York adopted a similar version of this doctrine: New York Penal 
Law §34.45. 
. Not all cases are easy to evaluate on such grounds, however. Consider Le 
Baron v. State (of Wisconsin) 32 Wisc. 294; 145 N.E.2d 79 in which the defend-
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Still, in all fairness, one must recognize the possibility that penal-
izing attempts and completions equally might in some cases weaken 
the motive for giving up before completion. This would not, of course, 
be so for anyone who is prepared to renounce his criminal purpose as 
a matter of moral principle. But one who is merely in personal tur-
moil about the rightness of advisability of his conduct, or one who 
has come to believe it is simply highly unlikely that he will be able 
to succeed anyway, may well reflect that he might as well go ahead. 
Mter all, convincing a jury that he gave up due to a renunciation of 
intent is an uncertain business at best. Yet if he cannot convince them 
of that, thus getting a lesser penalty, it really does not matter whether 
he finishes the crime or not. He will get the same penalty in either 
case if he is caught. As Huck Finn puts it: " ... what's the use of learn-
ing to do right when it's troublesome to do right and it ain't no trouble 
to do wrong, and the wages is just the same?"33 
Even acknowledging this problem, however, the gains to be gotten 
for the reformative aims of penal sanctions by equalizing the penalties 
for attempt and success seem to me to outweigh the possible disadvan-
tages noted. Once again, then, an objection to the proposed reform 
seems to be met adequately. 
D. Impossible Attempts. The proposal may, nevertheless, be at-
tacked on yet another ground. In cases in which the crime attempted 
was impossible of accomplishment, one may argue that it is unfair to 
treat the offender even on a par with other attempters, let alone those 
who are successful. Consider: a man who, as it turns out in the course 
of the event, is impotent, seizes a woman and tries to rape her. It was 
physically impossible for him to have achieved his purpose. Can he 
be guilty of attempted rape?34 Or consider a man who "places an il-
ant forced a woman into a shack and up against the wall and made further 
moves in preparation to rape her. The woman was finally able to convince him 
that she was pregnant and that he would hurt her baby if he proceeded. He gave 
up the attempt, warning her that if she screamed or went to the police after he 
left, he would kill her. It is uncertain whether this would fall within the meaning 
of "complete and voluntary" renunciation as defined above. 
33. Mark Twain, Huckleberry Finn in The Complete Works of Mark Twain 
(Garden City, 1964), chap. 16, p. 810. 
34. Preddy v. Commonwealth (of Virginia) 184 Va. 765; 36 S.E.2d 349 (1946). 
He was found guilty of attempt. 
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legal bet" on a horse which, as it turns out, has been scratched from 
the race an hour before. Is he guilty of an attempt to place an illegal 
bet?35 Or consider a man who attempts to buy what he thinks are 
stolen goods. They are not. Can he be convicted of an attempt to 
receive stolen property?36 
As can be seen, there has been some conflict among the cases as to 
the legitimacy of the defense of impossibility. More often than not, 
the courts have rejected the defense, as have academic writers.37 But 
whatever the resolution of the conflict turns out to be, we may safely 
argue that whatever is to be done with "impossible attempts" should 
be done on the issue of whether they are to be regardeq. as attempts 
at all. If they are, then one can see no reason for treating them differ-
ently than other attempts. If they are not, then the question does not 
arise. 
E. Generosity. Finally, it may be wise to comment on the sort of 
objection suggested by Plato's remarks (above, note 9). The sugges-
tion is that when the attempt does not come off, it is only gracious 
of us to exercise the virtue of generosity, to reduce the penalty as a 
way of marking the proper human response (i.e., joy, relief . . .) to 
fortuitous and happy turns of fate which prevented the completion 
of the crime. Such an objection is not in the least frivolous (though 
I have not given it the development it deserves). Benevolence and 
related virtues are of the first importance in the moral life, and there 
is every reason to believe, at least in terms of moral theory, that con-
siderations of what conduct would be virtuous with respect to criminal 
attempts ought to carry as much weight as considerations of what 
duties we have toward society and what values are involved in various 
sorts of policies on criminal attempt.3S Unfortunately for this objec-
tion, however, while spontaneous generosity "for no good reason" is 
35. O'Sullivan v. Peters (1951) SR (South Australia) 54. He was convicted. 
36. People (of New York) v. Jaffe 184 N.Y.497; 78 N.E. 169 (1906). It was 
held, on appeal, that since the crime he intended to commit could not possibly 
have been consummated even if he had succeeded in buying the goods, he could 
not be found guilty of an attempt. 
37. For a good overview of the problem, see Kadish and Paulsen, Criminal Law 
and Its Processes, pp. 393-410. 
38. I have argued for this thesis at length in On Justifying Moral Judgments 
(London and New York, 1973). 
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something without which life would hardly be bearable, its ossification 
into a policy (such as punishing all attempts less severely than suc~ 
cesses) eliminates its spontaneity, and hence, a necessary feature of 
what makes it virtuous to begin with. So again, the proposal for treat-
ing attempts on a par with successes must stand. 
v 
Some concern, however, may understandably be directed toward the 
question of the ramifications of this reform. In particular, the analysis 
of the nature of criminality given above has two rather startling conse-
quences which deserve mention, not to say further study. 
A. Criminal Negligence. If criminal harms come not from the con~ 
sequences of the victim's injuries, but rather from the consequences 
of the ways in which those harms come about, then an argument 
analogous to the one for treating criminal attempt and success equally 
suggests itself for cases of what might be called "uneventful" and 
"eventful" criminal negligence. Take the case of reckless driving. 
Suppose two men are driving in equally reckless ways-at night, per-
haps, in cars whose brakes and steering could not pass inspection stand-
ards, and through a residential section at high speed. One is unlucky 
enough to hit and kill a pedestrian who unwittingly steps into the 
street. The other had passed by the same spot, "uneventfully," in the 
same criminally reckless manner, several moments earlier. The crim-
inality of the acts is, it seems, equal, and the acts therefore ought to 
be punished equally. Yet we charge the one with only reckless driving, 
a relatively minor offense, and the other with negligent manslaughter. 
The difference in the two offenses is one of mere chance, just as is 
the difference between the assassin whose bullet hits the belt buckle 
and the one whose bullet finds its target. To be consistent with the 
analysis of criminal attempt given here, then, it seems we should 
equalize the penalties for both "uneventful" and "eventful" negligence. 
Resistance to any such proposal would doubtless be strong-and 
based on a complex of factors, not the least of which is the difficulty 
of determining degrees of negligence prospectively. Just as occasion-
ally we may use the very fact that an injury resulted from some sort 
of unusual conduct as evidence that the conduct was negligent, so 
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too it may happen that we cannot determine whether an act was 
negligent, or how negligent it was, in the absence of some physical 
damage done. This proof problem, it may be argued, militates against 
extending the attempt argument analogously to uneventful negli-
gence. But it is clear that the issue needs careful analysis. 
As to whether such a startling consequence casts a question mark 
over the adequacy of the whole analysis of criminal wrongs proposed 
here, I can only remark that it is not at all unusual for the law to 
have to depart from even the clearest and most thoroughly grounded 
rules, principles or conceptualizations for reasons of equity or even 
practicality. If that is so in this case, it need not destroy the value of 
the analysis for other parts of the criminal law. 
B. Motive vs. Intent. Another consequence suggested by the account 
of criminality given here is the reform of the criminal law's traditional 
refusal to differentiate offenses on the ground of motive, as opposed 
to intent. If, again, criminal harms come from the consequence of 
the way in which the victim's injuries (or the social harms) are ac-
complished, then it seems irrational to exclude a consideration of 
motive in grading offenses. We respond very differently (and in ways 
which alter the social harms done) to violations of the law done 
as a matter of civil disobedience than we do to the same violations 
done for purely personal and antisocial motives. Yet the law as it 
stands does not allow a consideration of motive to enter the judicial 
process in determining the seriousness of the crime (except as a 
matter of discretionary prosecution or as a matter of judicial dis-
cretion in sentencing).39 It might be argued, then, that the reform 
of attempt law proposed here should be extended to include a reform 
of the law with regard to motive. Like the extension with regard to 
criminal negligence, however, I suspect that a rather extensive in-
quiry would be needed to assess such a suggestion. 
39. See, for example, Chandler v. DPP [1962] 3 W.L.R. 694 in which protesters 
at a Royal Air Force base were not permitted to defend their illegal acts in terms 
of their motives of civil disobedience. For an argument in favor of exercising 
prosecutorial and sentencing discretion with respect to some forms of civil dis-
obedience, see Ronald Dworkin, "On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience," re-
printed in Murphy, Civil Disobedience and Violence (Belmont, Calif., 1971), pp. 
112-130. 
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C. Transferred Intent. Finally, in addition to these somewhat prob-
lematic extrapolations, the theory of criminality given here has at 
least one rather straightforward extension: it renders the transferred 
malice (or intent) rule easily intelligible. The rule is, oversimply, that 
when X is trying to murder Y, but misses and accidentally kills Z, his 
malice or intent toward Y "transfers" to Z and he may be charged 
with murder. 
On the basis of the usual theory of crimes, the rule is a bit problem-
atical, for it looks as though the criminal is punished either for the 
unintended result (the accidental harm done a bystander) or the mere 
intent toward the intended victim. One alternative is uncomfortable 
in terms of standard accounts of the rationale for the mens rea re-
quirement; the other is uncomfortable in terms of the principle of not 
punishing mere intent. Clearly, understanding criminal wrong as the 
social instability created by the process of doing certain things pro-
vides a ready and easily intelligible rationale for the transferred malice 
rule.40 
Perhaps enough has been said, then, to establish the main points: 
that reform of the theory of the law of crimes, and the consequent 
reform of the law of criminal attempt, are clearly indicated as part 
of the continuing process of rationalizing the criminal law. The 
analogous extensions of these reforms will, of course, have to be sub-
jected to further study. But the lines of inquiry look promising, and 
it appears that they will confirm rather than disconfirm the results 
reached here. 
40. For a clear statement of the difficulties in the traditional justification for 
transferred malice, see Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 
§49. And on the U.S. version, see LaFave and Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law, 
pp. 252-255· 
